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NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS AND THE ROLE OF
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
DURING ARMED CONFLICTS
DAN E. STIGALL* & CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The non-state armed group and terrorist organization known,
variously, as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or
Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS) is the brutal offspring of Al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Rising from relative obscurity in the summer
of 2014, it has since savagely torn through large swaths of Iraq and
Syria, killing scores of innocent civilians in the process, while bringing misery to those who remain under its oppressive rule, and proving a daunting challenge to countries wishing to contain it.1 The
* Dan E. Stigall is an attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs (OIA), where he serves as Coordinator for International Security Affairs.
Prior to joining the Department of Justice, he served on active duty in the U.S. Army JAG
Corps from 2001–2009, serving in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. He
continues to serve as a U.S. Army Reservist in the 150th Legal Operations Detachment
(LOD). LL.M. 2009, George Washington University Law School; J.D. 2000, Louisiana State
University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center; B.A. 1996, Louisiana State University. Any opinion
expressed in this Article is solely that of the author and not necessarily that of the Department of Defense or the Department of Justice. He would like to thank his friends and
colleagues Professor Sean Foley and Professor Chris Jenks for taking the time to read this
Article and offer their insight.
** Christopher L. Blakesley is the Cobeaga Professor of Law and a Barrick Distinguished Scholar at the University of Nevada Las Vegas. He is also the J.Y. Sanders Professor Emeritus at the Louisiana State University Law Center. He formerly was an attorney in
the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. J.S.D. 1985, Columbia University; LL.M. 1976, Columbia University; J.D. 1973, University of Utah; M.A. 1970, The
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University; B.A. 1968, University of Utah. He
has published ten books, including TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM: A NORMATIVE AND
PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT (2006), TERRORISM, DRUGS, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY
(1991), THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2000) (coauthored),
GLOBAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW (with Linda Carter and Peter Henning 2007), and GLOBAL
ISSUES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (co-authored, as above). He has also published approximately thirty chapters in books, and nearly one hundred articles in U.S. and foreign law
journals. He would like to thank Jessica Gandy for her excellent research assistance with
this Article. Both authors wish to thank the editors of The George Washington International Law Review for their hard work and assistance with this Article.
1. See Dan E. Stigall, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is, GLOB. BRIEF (Nov. 7,
2014, 10:09 AM), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2014/11/07/%e2%80%9cthe-islamic-stateof-iraq-and-syria-isis-is%e2%80%a6%c2%a0/ (“[ISIS is] a non-state armed group that, by
exploiting ungoverned spaces and state fragility in the Middle East, has asserted a degree
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situation caused by ISIS has also proven to be a challenge to the
international legal system, presenting difficult questions relating to
the use of armed force2 and appropriate state responses to nonstate armed groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa.
One of these challenges is how countries in the Middle East and
North Africa may effectively respond to such non-state armed
groups within the context of their domestic criminal justice
frameworks.3 Although military force is obviously required as one
element of the response to ISIS and similar groups, the nature of
such groups requires a complex approach—an approach that combines military force with a variety of other elements of state power,
including criminal prosecutions.4 This need for a multifaceted
response is emphasized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, which expressly recognizes that “terrorism will not be
defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone[.]”5 Any effort to counter ISIS, therefore,
will necessitate international cooperation on a variety of levels.6
of control over a large swath of territory that transcends the borders of Iraq and Syria. In
so doing, ISIS has become a stark reminder of the dangers posed by ungoverned spaces—
lawless expanses of the globe left effectively unregulated by sovereign authority, where
terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal groups are permitted to thrive.”).
2. See Louise Arimatsu & Michael Schmitt, The Legal Basis for the War Against Isis
Remains Contentious, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/oct/06/legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamic-state.
3. See Marlise Simons, Spurred by ISIS Violence, Nations Mull How to Press for Justice in
Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2014, at A8 (“Another option now being quietly negotiated is
to use courts in the relative safety of northern Iraq or elsewhere in the region where there
is a reasonably well-functioning judicial system. The legal foundation to try crimes committed in Iraq or Syria by their own citizens already exists in many countries if there is a
political will, legal experts say. Most countries in the region, for instance, have signed the
international convention banning torture, or the one against genocide.”).
4. See Arabinda Acharya & Dharitri Dwivedy, The ISIS Threat in Perspective, GLOB. BRIEF
(Nov. 7, 2014, 5:57 AM), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2014/11/07/the-isis-threat-in-perspective/ (“Ultimately, success against ISIS will depend on how the fight is conducted.
Military strikes alone may win the day for the US-led coalition in the coming months, but
defeating ISIS or ISIS-like groups will surely require countering their ideology and restricting their ability to amass resources (human, money and materiel). In other words, the
kinetic aspects of counterterrorism—including air strikes or targeted killings—may lose
their relevance as soon as the threat appears to be losing its steam, while the impact of
counter-ideology and counter-financing measures can be long-term and sustaining.”).
5. S.C. Res. 2178, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2014).
6. See BRIAN KATULIS, HARDIN LANG, & VIKRAM SINGH, DEFEATING ISIS: AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY TO ADVANCE MIDDLE EAST STABILITY 2 (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/09/10/96739/defeating-isis-an-integrated-strategy-to-advance-middle-east-stability/ (“As with efforts to counter extremism
elsewhere, defeating ISIS will require a concentrated effort over time. Any successful U.S.
strategy must be built on a foundation of regional cooperation that requires coordinated
action from U.S. partners—a central concept of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
that President Barack Obama proposed earlier this year. The strategy will be multifaceted,

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\48-1\JLE101.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 3

Transnational Criminal Law During Armed Conflicts

20-OCT-15

15:05

3

The legal complexities that states will encounter in their
attempts to cooperate in the fight against ISIS and other non-state
armed groups are myriad. Confusion as to available legal bases
and extant authorities remains an obstacle to effective cooperation. For example, in a publication by the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) entitled International Cooperation in
Criminal Matters: Counterterrorism, the United Nations articulates a
problematic legal proposition with the potential for staggeringly
negative consequences. It notes that “[t]he universal counter-terrorism conventions and protocols do not apply in situations of
armed conflict.”7 This sentence, and subsequent language expressing its rationale, take the view that the presence of an armed conflict mutes the legal force of the various multilateral conventions
that enable international cooperation between states in criminal
matters. As this Article will demonstrate, this legal conclusion—if
true—would essentially prevent major cooperative efforts in criminal justice and law enforcement matters in areas experiencing
armed conflict. The potential ramifications of such a legal outcome would be harmful to countries in the Middle East experiencing intense and large-scale terrorist attacks, most notably those
impacted by the ISIS phenomenon. Fortunately, a closer analysis
of international law reveals the legal conclusion articulated by the
United Nations to be incorrect. This Article, therefore, posits that
the United Nations should promptly and publicly correct its analysis and issue clear guidance stating that the terrorism suppression
conventions (and transnational criminal law generally) continue to
apply during armed conflicts.
While this Article does not seek to overstate the current impact
of this U.N. guidance, it is worth noting that UNODC is an important United Nations entity and a key international actor in the fight
against transnational crime and terrorism. Its pronouncements on
the applicability of international treaties are, therefore, important
and carry with them the possibility of far-reaching impact. Inaccuracies in such a context can have enormous ramifications and,
involving intelligence cooperation, security support, vigorous regional and international
diplomacy, strategic communications and public diplomacy, and political engagement.”);
see also Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, Joint Statement Issued by Partners at the
Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm (noting that “ISIL/Daesh’s finances and recruitment are
also increasingly being challenged through international cooperation.”).
7. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: COUNTERTERRORISM 28 (2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Training_Curriculum_Module3/Module3_EN.pdf.
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accordingly, must be addressed. Beyond the necessary response
such a pronouncement occasions, however, this particular U.N.
guidance presents an opportunity for a wider (and much needed)
discussion of the law of armed conflict, transnational criminal law,
and the ways in which various subsets of international law interact.
In support of its analysis, this Article explores the complex international legal framework that governs international cooperation in
the Middle East and North Africa, analyzing the treaties which
form the basis for much of that cooperation, as well as the larger
field of transnational criminal law. Transnational criminal law is
defined, in general terms, as “the law that suppresses crime that
transcends national frontiers,”8 and it is mainly within the context
of transnational criminal law’s structures that states cooperate to
facilitate the investigation and prosecution of cross-border criminal
activity. As described more fully below, the universal counter-terrorism conventions and protocols are part of the expansive constellations of treaties that make up the firmament of transnational
criminal law. This Article will discuss their current use and potential role in addressing the security situation in the Middle East and
North Africa, and will also demonstrate that, contrary to the U.N.
position, the body of transnational criminal law—including universal counter-terrorism conventions and protocols—remains largely
applicable amidst wars, revolutions, and other hostilities. To support this legal conclusion, this Article delves into an unfrequented
area of international law which lies at the crossroads of transnational criminal law and the law of armed conflict.
II.

ISIS

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

OF THE

It is useful at the outset to comment briefly on the geographic
area central to our inquiry. The collection of countries commonly
referred to as “the Middle East” consists of Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, the Palestinian
Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. When widening that lens to North African countries—so that our referent is both the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA)—the list expands to include the countries of
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.9
8. NEIL BOISTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 13 (2012).
9. See ELLEN LUST, THE MIDDLE EAST v–vi (13th ed. 2014).
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With so many diverse countries and cultures, it is an obvious
error to speak of the region as a monolith. As Ellen Lust notes in
her excellent book on the topic, “The Middle East is as varied and
complex as any other region, including the ‘West.’”10 And yet,
there are certain elements that lend a degree of common identity
to these widely diverse countries—one that is “underpinned by the
notion of a relatively common past, religion, and language.”11
Additionally, certain other (more unfortunate) commonalities
seem, in various degrees, to plague the region as a whole. As
another U.N. publication noted, “The Middle East and North
Africa region has long been marked by political instability, human
rights crises and protracted humanitarian emergencies.”12 Likewise, Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Senior Special Assistant to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, notes the long history of
complexity and the deep, tangled roots of the region’s contemporary dysfunction:
The dysfunctional order that defines today’s Middle East has
been shaped by critical events in both ancient and modern history: the Arab invasion of Persia in 633 AD, the Battle of
Chaldiran and Ottoman-Safavid (Sunni-Shia) regional rivalry in
the 16th century, WW1 and its colonial legacy, the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, the Arab Spring, and now the Arab Winter. All of these
and many more have contributed to the complex regional landscape, including its myriad sectarian divisions.13

The current situation in the Middle East and North Africa is,
thus, characterized by complex social and political challenges
made worse by ongoing conflict and political upheaval.
Recent years have witnessed especially dramatic political and
social upheaval as the reverberations of the Arab Spring14 have
10. Id. at xxxi.
11. Id. at 1.
12. UNICEF, HUMANITARIAN ACTION FOR CHILDREN: MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
36 (2012), http://www.unicef.org/hac2012/files/HAC2012_MENA_LOW__WEB_Final
.pdf.
13. Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Can the Middle East Be Fixed?, GLOB. BRIEF (Nov. 7, 2014,
8:30 AM), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2014/11/07/can-the-middle-east-be-fixed/.
14. See MARC LYNCH, THE ARAB UPRISING: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTIONS OF THE NEW
MIDDLE EAST 7 (2012) (“The uprisings that have profoundly shaped the Middle East began
in a remote outpost of southern Tunisia on December 17, 2010, with the self-immolation
of an unknown young man named Mohammed Bouazizi in protest against abusive and
corrupt police.”); see also Ayodeji K. Perrin, Introduction to the Special Issue on the Arab Spring,
34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. i, i–iv (2013) (“What quickly became known as the “Arab Spring” is a
series of protest movements, reform movements, and revolutions[.]”). But see CHIBLI MALLAT, PHILOSOPHY OF NONVIOLENCE: REVOLUTION, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND JUSTICE BEYOND
THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (2015) (disfavoring the label “Arab Spring” as being “as inchoate as it is
poetical” and preferring the label of “the Middle East nonviolent revolution.”).
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made countries in the region more prone to “destabilizing ethnic
and sectarian rivalries”15 and “created opportunities for extremist
groups to find ungoverned space from which to destabilize the new
governments[.]”16 Extremist groups, benefitting from the years of
turmoil in the region, have thrived and metastasized.17 Today,
most notable among these groups is ISIS—a formidable terrorist
organization that evolved from a number of previously existing terrorist groups, most significantly Al-Qa’eda in Iraq (AQ-I), which
was established on October 15, 2006, as “an umbrella organization
composed of and supported by a variety of insurgency groups operating in Iraq.”18
Although ISIS has only recently gained widespread public attention, commentators note that ISIS “did not suddenly become effective in early June 2014[.]”19 Rather, the terrorist group “had been
steadily strengthening and actively shaping the future operating
environment for four years.”20 Developments such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 and the Syrian civil war (a
civil war which provided ISIS with ungoverned spaces in which to
operate and “a reinvigorated pipeline of suicide bombers”)21 have
provided ISIS with an advantageous operational environment. In
addition, Acharya and Dwivedy posit that “[p]rolonged instability,
unmet promises of reform, and more general economic woes exacerbated public frustration and increased the susceptibility to radicalization. All of this the jihadists exploited.”22 This created a
15. U.S. Intelligence: Arab Spring Generated Threats, WOODROW WILSON CTR. (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/us-intelligence-arab-spring-generated-threats.
16. Id.
17. See The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria: Two Arab Countries Fall Apart, ECONOMIST (June 14, 2014) [hereinafter Two Arab Countries Fall Apart], http://www.economist
.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604230-extreme-islamist-group-seeks-create-caliphate-and-spread-jihad-across.
18. U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ (UNAMI), REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIANS IN THE NON INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN IRAQ 1 n.3 (June 5, 2014), http:/
/www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report_FINAL_6
July_10September2014.pdf. These groups include Al-Qa’eda’s predecessor, the Mujahideen Shura Council, as well as al-Qa’eda, Jeish al-Fatiheen, Jund al-Sahaba, Katbiyan
Ansar Al-Tawhid wal Sunnah, Jeish al-Taiifa al-Mansoura, and other Sunni based groups.
Id.
19. Michael Knights, ISIL’s Political-Military Power in Iraq, CTC SENTINEL, Aug. 27, 2014,
at 2, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/isils-political-military-power-in-iraq.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Acharya & Dwivedy, supra note 4. The domestic policies of former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki are also noted by many as exacerbating the frustrations of Iraq’s Sunni
population. See, e.g., Priyanka Boghani, In Their Own Words: Sunnis on Their Treatment in
Maliki’s Iraq, PBS (Oct. 28, 2014).
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favorable environment for the devastating ISIS offensive of 2014.
On June 10, 2014, ISIS captured the Iraqi city of Mosul (Iraq’s second city) as well as a large part of the province of Nineveh,23 then
continued south towards Iraq’s capital, Baghdad, taking control of
several towns as it advanced. As an article in The Economist noted,
“Ministers in Iraq’s government admitted that a catastrophe was in
the making. A decade after the American invasion, the country
looks as fragile, bloody and pitiful as ever.”24
Since that time, ISIS has managed to assert control over a large
swath of territory that transcends the borders of Iraq and Syria, and
has proclaimed that territory to be part of a new caliphate or
Islamic state25 in an effort to “restore the glory days of the Abbasid
caliphate based in Baghdad.”26 The group’s power and capabilities
have also increased since that time, as its military advances have
provided it control over resources such as abandoned army bases,
weapons, ammunition, vehicles, banks, and government offices.27
In that regard, one U.N. report indicates that ISIS has seized
“enough assets from conventional armies to ‘arm and equip more
than three Iraqi conventional army divisions.’”28 Notably, ISIS is
also deriving significant funding—once estimated at between $800
million and $1 billion per year—from various other sources,
including ransoms and revenues from captured oil and gas fields.29
23. Two Arab Countries Fall Apart, supra note 17.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. William McCants, Why ISIS Really Wants to Conquer Baghdad, BROOKINGS (Nov. 12,
2014, 1:15 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2014/11/12-baghdad-of-al-rashid-mccants.
27. See U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Nov. 13, 2014 from the Chair of Security
Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning AlQaida and Associated Individuals and Entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, at 19–27, U.N. Doc. S/2014-815 (Nov. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Letter], http://www
.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/815&referer=/english/&Lang=E.
28. Id. ¶ 39.
29. Acharya & Dwivedy, supra note 4; see also Louise Shelley, Blood Money, How ISIS
Makes Bank, FOREIGN AFF. (NOV. 30, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/
2014-11-30/blood-money. (“The terrorist group has become the world’s richest precisely
because it has seized some of the world’s most profitable oil fields in Iraq and Syria. Even
with those fields operating below capacity due to a lack of technology and personnel, ISIS
is estimated to be producing about 44,000 barrels a day in Syria and 4,000 barrels a day in
Iraq. ISIS sells crude at a discount (around $20–$35 per barrel) to either truckers or middlemen. The crude gets to refiners at around $60 per barrel, which is still under market
price. Smugglers pay about $5,000 in bribes at checkpoints to move the crude oil out of
ISIS controlled territory. Even selling the oil at a discount via pre-invasion smuggling
routes out of Iraq, ISIS can still expect over a million dollars in revenue each day.”). But see
Richard Engel & Robert Windrem, ISIS Makes Three Times as Much from Oil Smuggling as
Previously Thought: Officials, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2015) (noting, “Two U.S. counter-terror-

R
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With these arms and funding sources, ISIS is now considered a selfsufficient terrorist organization30—and “a continuing threat to
international peace and security.”31 More importantly, for purposes of this Article, it has created situations in both Iraq and Syria
that have been classified as non-international armed conflicts.32
III.

DEFINING THE COMPETING LEGAL REGIMES: TRANSNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT

If ISIS and similar non-state armed groups can only be defeated
by maximizing international and regional cooperation, it is critical
to understand the available mechanisms that the international
legal regime provides to do so. Consequently, a fulsome exploration of transnational criminal law, the law of non-international
armed conflict, and the interaction between these two legal
regimes, is essential.
A.

Transnational Criminal Law

The subject of transnational criminal law does not lend itself to
easy definition. In his book on the topic, Neil Boister notes that
the term “transnational crime” was first used at the Fifth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders in
ism officials now tell NBC News that the amount of money ISIS can earn from selling and
smuggling oil and gas is roughly to $8 to $10 million a month. The officials said this is the
most accurate information they have had so far, calling previous estimates speculation.”).
30. See Letter, supra note 27, ¶ 52.
31. Id. ¶ 51.
32. UNAMI, supra note 18, at i. (“The non-international armed conflict that commenced in Iraq in Anbar governorate in January 2014 and has since spread to other areas
of the country since the beginning of June has inflicted untold hardship and suffering on
the civilian population with large-scale killings, injuries, and destruction and damage of
livelihoods and property. The minimum number of civilians killed in the first six months
of 2014 is 5,576, with at least 11,665 wounded. Since the beginning of June 2014, a minimum of 1,531 civilians have been killed and 1,763 have been wounded, and some 1.2
million people have been internally displaced as a result of the violence – including over
600,000 since the beginning of June alone.”); see also LOUISE ARIMATSU & MOHBUBA
CHOUDHURY, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE ARMED CONFLICTS IN
SYRIA, YEMEN AND LIBYA 16 (2014) (“Despite the level of political and material support that
both the opposition groups in Syria and the FSA have been able to secure from other
states, the legal experts were of the opinion that the armed conflict – at least until March
2013 – remained non-international in character since there was inadequate evidence to
suggest that any of the anti-Assad armed groups were under the overall control of another
state. The level and nature of external involvement in the conflict may constitute violations of international law but neither would alter the character of the armed conflict. Syria
is not a signatory to APII; consequently, the NIAC is governed by CA3 and customary international law.”).

R
R
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1975 “to identify certain criminal phenomenon transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states, or having
an impact on another country.”33 It is perhaps because the field of
transnational criminal law is “newly emerging and rapidly growing”34 that its precise definition remains somewhat unsettled.
Another leading text, drawing on Phillip Jessup’s definition of
“transnational law,” defines transnational criminal law as “the part
of any nation’s domestic criminal law that ‘regulates actions or
events that transcend national frontiers.’”35 Boister takes a somewhat stricter view and posits that “[t]ransnational criminal law is
limited to those offences where states use a convention designed to
suppress a particular form of conduct—a ‘suppression convention’—to provide for a mutual obligation to criminalize that
conduct.”36
To understand the complexity surrounding the task of defining
transnational criminal law, it is helpful to briefly address its history
and structure. The problem of transnational crime obviously predates the moment the idea crystallized as a distinct legal concept.
Historically, states have recognized certain discrete categories of
crime, which required international cooperation or collaboration
due to the crime’s cross-border effect. In that regard, Boister notes
that piracy “is the first historical example of a transnational
crime,”37 while other early examples include crimes associated with
the nineteenth-century slave trade.38 Part of the international
response to these sorts of crimes has been the creation of multilateral treaties designed to obligate states to criminalize certain transnational conduct; to impose on states the obligation to prohibit a
particular crime within their respective domestic jurisdictions; to
impose on states the obligation to prosecute offenders; and to
impose obligations to cooperate with other states in the prevention
and suppression of the crime.39 These multilateral conventions are
33. BOISTER, supra note 8, at 3–4 (citing GOW Mueller, Transnational Crime: Definitions
and Concepts, in COMBATTING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: CONCEPT, ACTIVITIES, RESPONSES 13 (P.
Williances & D. Vlassis eds., 2001).
34. Erin Creegan, National Security Crime, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 373, 375 (2012).
35. DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2014) (citing PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2
(1956)).
36. See BOISTER, supra note 8, at 14.
37. Id. at 27.
38. See id. at 36–38.
39. See Bruce Broomhall, War Crimes Research Symposium: “Terrorism on Trial”: State
Actors in an International Definition of Terrorism from a Human Rights Perspective, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 421, 425 (2004).
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called “suppression conventions.”40 Examples of such conventions
include the U.N. Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),41 the
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
(UNTOC),42 and the 1988 Vienna Convention against the Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Drug
Convention).43
It is important to note, however, that while multilateral suppression conventions comprise a significant part of the fabric of transnational criminal law, bilateral conventions and the domestic law
of states (either seeking or affording assistance) play an equally
important role. For instance, with regard to Iraq—a country currently at the epicenter of the battle against ISIS—“mutual legal
assistance relations are primarily governed by the bilateral and
multi-lateral treaties to which Iraq is party. In case of the absence
of such treaty or agreement, mutual legal assistance can be provided on the basis of reciprocity.”44 For mutual legal assistance
outside the treaty framework, Iraqi law provides that:
If a foreign state wants to take measures to pursue an investigation into any offence by means of the judicial authorities in Iraq
it must send a request to this effect through diplomatic channels
to the Ministry of Justice and the request must be accompanied
by a complete statement of the circumstances of the offence, the
evidence for the charge the paragraphs of the law which apply
and a detailed specification of the measures which it wishes to
take.45
40. See BOISTER, supra note 8, at 14 (“From early beginnings such as Great Britain’s
bilateral anti-slave-trading treaties in the early nineteenth century, through early multilateral treaties like the 1929 Anti-Counterfeiting Convention, to the large framework conventions of the late twentieth century such as the 1988 Drug Trafficking Convention, treaty
obligations to criminalize distinguish transnational criminal law from national criminal
law.”).
41. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S.
154, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/0850026_E.pdf.
42. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15,
2000, 209 U.N.T.S. 2225, http://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/
organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_
ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf.
43. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 497, 95 U.N.T.S. 1582, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201582/v1582.pdf.
44. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (MENAFATF),
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM (IRAQ) ¶ 31 (Nov. 28, 2012) [hereinafter MENAFATF REPORT], http://www
.menafatf.org/MER/MER_Iraq_English.pdf.
45. Criminal Procedure Code No. 23 of 1971 (as amended to Mar. 14, 2010), Law No.
23 of 1971, Decree No. 230 (Iraq), art. 353.
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Similarly, Iraqi law provides a means for countries to request and
obtain the extradition of non-Iraqis found in the territory of Iraq.46
A report by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action
Task Force (MENAFATF) notes that, under Iraqi law, “[d]ual criminality is formally required for all mutual legal assistance and extradition requests, even for less intrusive and non compulsory
measures.”47 Nothing in the Iraqi provisions technically requires a
treaty in order for assistance to be granted, though mutual legal
assistance or extradition requested in the absence of a treaty is not
rooted in an international legal obligation and is, therefore,
discretionary.48
Although such domestic legal provisions permit international
cooperation to a degree, the important role of treaties—and the
concomitant international legal obligations they create—should
not be underemphasized. On that score, commentators have
noted that “a lack of adequate treaty provisions regarding judicial
cooperation has indeed often provided an obstacle in practice,
contributing to delays or even failure to prosecute[.]”49 The treaties, which comprise the major components of transnational criminal law, therefore, serve to enable much needed international
cooperation. If muted, the legal bases for that cooperation are lost
and cooperative efforts among states can fail, permitting criminals
and terrorists to operate with impunity.50
Given the way in which these suppression treaties formed—
focusing on discrete kinds of criminal activity and enabling international cooperation vis-à-vis that specific criminal activity—and
the way in which states adopted discrete bilateral treaties and individually enacted domestic legislation enabling international cooperation, the configuration of transnational criminal law (as a subset
of international law) resembles a solar system far more than a linear legal landscape. It is a vast, pointillistic array of international
treaties and domestic statutes that are not necessarily interrelated
but which, nonetheless, contain commonalities and in the aggregate combine to form a discernible area of international law.
46. See id. art. 357.
47. MENAFATF REPORT, supra note 44, ¶ 31.
48. See id.
49. Ward Ferdinandusse, Improving Inter-State Cooperation for the National Prosecution of
International Crimes: Towards a New Treaty?, ASIL INSIGHTS (July 21, 2014).
50. See Dan E. Stigall, Countering Convergence: “Central Authorities” and the Global Network
to Combat Transnational Crime and Terrorism, SMALL WARS J. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://small
warsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-convergence-%E2%80%9Ccentral-authorities%E2%
80%9D-and-the-global-network-to-combat-transnational.
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Two core areas of practice in transnational criminal law are
mutual legal assistance and extradition. Mutual legal assistance is
the “process by which states seek and provide assistance in gathering evidence for use in criminal cases or in the restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime.”51 Extradition, in turn, is the
mechanism by which one sovereign requests and obtains custody of
a fugitive located within the jurisdiction and control of another
sovereign.52 Through the extradition process, a sovereign (the
requesting state) typically makes a formal request to another sovereign (the requested state).53 If the fugitive is found within the territory of the requested state, the requested state may arrest the
fugitive and subject him or her to its extradition process.54 A discussion of the historical context of both extradition and mutual
legal assistance reveals critical elements of their international legal
character and serves to illuminate how these functions of transnational criminal law interact with other legal regimes, such as the
law of armed conflict.
1.

Mutual Legal Assistance

Prost notes that, for many years, states relied upon traditional
letters rogatory—formal documents submitted through diplomatic
channels—to obtain needed evidence from foreign counterparts.55
Boister indicates that letters rogatory (“a process borrowed from
international civil procedure”) entailed a request from one judicial
authority that was communicated through diplomatic channels to a
foreign judicial authority.56 As this method proved insufficient to
meet “the growing demand for speedy and effective assistance, in
evidence gathering,” however, new mechanisms were developed
during the twentieth century.57
Letters rogatory did not provide for the scope of assistance
required, nor were they efficient enough to allow for the pro51. See Kimberly Prost, The Need for a Multilateral Cooperative Framework for Mutual Legal
Assistance, in COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER: MEETING THE CHALLENGES 93 (Larissa Van Den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds., 2013).
52. See LINDA CARTER, CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY, & PETER HENNING, GLOBAL ISSUES IN
CRIMINAL LAW 63 (2007).
53. See ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON, & ELIZABETH WILLIAMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 95 (2010).
54. See id.
55. See Kimberly Prost, Breaking Down the Barriers: International Cooperation in Combating
Transnational Crime, ORG. AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/can/
en_can_prost.en.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
56. BOISTER, supra note 8, at 197.
57. Prost, supra note 55.
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duction of the evidence, within a reasonable period of time. As
well, because of fundamental differences between investigative
authorities and process in civil and common law states, letters
rogatory were in many instances ineffective as between states of
a different legal tradition.58

The new method of international cooperation that emerged in
the twentieth century is known as “mutual legal assistance.”59 With
the emergence of this new paradigm, treaties were implemented in
order to create a more streamlined, efficient approach to
obtaining evidence from international partners. The first such
treaty, the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance,
was under the auspices of the Council of Europe.60 Implementing
an international legal obligation to grant mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters, this treaty served as a model for the modern
framework by articulating the scope, procedures, and conditions
for mutual legal assistance.61 Since that treaty was signed, both
bilateral and multilateral mutual legal assistance treaties have proliferated in the international arena,62 and mutual legal assistance
has become a “cornerstone of global cooperation on law enforcement and one of the most widely used mechanisms for requesting
foreign assistance in domestic criminal investigations and
prosecutions.”63
2.

Extradition

In contrast to mutual legal assistance, the history of extradition is
far more ancient and extensive. Extradition is the international
legal rendition of fugitives charged with an extraditable offense
and sought for trial, or already convicted and sought for punishment.64 In 1878 Fernand de Cardaillac defined extradition as “the
58. Id.
59. BOISTER, supra note 8, at 198.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 198–99.
63. Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age, HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/.
64. The history of extradition and the debate over its use since antiquity for common
crimes have been discussed by several scholars, including Christopher L. Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the United States: An Exercise in Comparative and International Law, 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 653, 653–59, nn.1–8 (1980); CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 173–85 (1991);
those referenced in the footnotes for this section. See also ROGER MERLE & ANDRÉ VITU,
TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL, TOME I 426–28, §§ 317–18 (7th ed. 1997); MARJORY WHITEMAN,
6 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (Extradition) (1968). Note, however, that some commentators have argued that the top administrative court in France, le Conseil d’Etat should
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right for a State on the territory of which an accused or convicted
person has taken refuge, to deliver him up to another State which
has requisitioned his return and is competent to judge and punish
him.”65 Extradition is appropriate only when formal charges have
been issued against the fugitive by a proper legal authority. Marjory Whiteman notes that under United States law and that of
many countries, extradition is not appropriate upon mere suspicion or to obtain a person whose presence is desired as a witness.66
Extradition is a criminal matter and not appropriate for obtaining
or enforcing a civil judgment.67
The actual term “extradition” was imported to the United States
from France, where the decret-loi of February 19, 1791, appears to
be the first official document to have used it and the term is not
found in treaties or conventions until 1828.68 Although the actual
term “extradition” was not used extensively until the late eighteenth century, the legal process has been extant since deep into
antiquity, and equivalent or similar terms were not uncommon.69
In fact, the earliest known diplomatic document of any type contains a section providing for the reciprocal rendition of fugitives:
the Treaty of Peace between Rameses II, Pharaoh of Egypt, and the
Hittite King Hattusili III, which was signed after the latter’s abortive attempt to invade and conquer Egypt.70 This document, writtake more prominence in the realm of extradition. The Conseil d’Etat protects many of the
individual’s civil liberties against abuse of authority and abuse of power. See MERLE & VITU,
supra this note, at 428.
65. FERNAND DE CARDAILLAC, DE L’EXTRADITION 3–4 (1878) (author’s translation).
More recently, French commentators defined it as “[t]he procedure by which a sovereign
state, the requested state, accepts to deliver an individual who is found on this latter’s
territory to another state, the requesting state, to permit the latter to judge the subject or,
if he has already been convicted, to have it execute its sentence.” ROGER MERLE & ANDRÉ
VITU, supra note 64, at 426, § 317.
66. See WHITEMAN, supra note 64, at 727.
67. See id.
68. See A. BILLOT, TRAITÉ DE L’EXTRADITION 34–37 (1874); IVAN SHEARER, EXTRADITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1971).
69. Remitere, restituer, livrer, were used more often than trader. See FAUSTIN HÉLIE,
TRAITÉ DE I’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE Liv. II, 169–72 (2d ed. 1866); BILLOT, supra note 68, at
35; SHEARER, supra note 68, at 5 (noting article 20 of the Treaty of Amiens states that the
contracting parties “are to be obligated to deliver to justice the persons accused.”)
(author’s translation of: “seront tenu de livrer en justice les personnes accusées.”); Le Barron E.
Descamp & Louis Renault, 1 RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DES TRAITÉS DU XIXÈME SIÈCLE 33, 42
(1801–1825), 42 DALLOZ, RÉPERTOIRE DE LÉGISLATION, DOCTRINE ET JURISPRUDENCE 495,
579–80 (1861), Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain, Spain and the Batavian
Republic art. 20, Mar. 27, 1802, 56 Parry’s T.S. 289, http://www.napoleon-series.org/
research/government/diplomatic/c_amiens.html [hereinafter Treaty of Amiens].
70. See CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: U.S. LAW & PRACTICE 2–3 (3d
ed. 1996); see SHEARER, supra note 68, at 5–6, (citing Langdon & Gardiner, The Treaty of
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ten in hieroglyphics, was carved onto the Temple of Ammon at
Karnak and is also preserved on clay tablets in Akkodrain in the
Hittite archives of Boghazkoi.71 It is characteristic of most early
examples of extradition or legal rendition agreements in that
extradition was only part of, and incidental to, a larger document
designed for a larger purpose, such as a peace treaty or treaty of
friendship. This was also true for the first extradition documents
of the so-called modern era.72
The French spent a significant amount of doctrinal and analytical energy considering the question of whether extradition
occurred in antiquity and the Middle Ages, some arguing that
extradition was part of natural law and others arguing that prior to
the nineteenth century, extradition did not exist.73 It was also
believed that rendition was haphazard and that coercion, not the
binding force of law, was the true motivator of compliance with
such requests.74 Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin presented examples
of “extradition” as proof that all nations had a “natural right” and
“duty” either to extradite or prosecute malefactors.75 The Grotius/
Bodin position was based on the notion that extradition occurred
Alliance Between Hattusili, King of the Hittites, and the Pharoah Rameses II of Egypt, 6 J. EGYPTIAN
ARCHAEOLOGY 179, 192–94 (1920), and W. Mettgenberg, Von mehr als 3000 Jahren: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Auslieferungsrechts, 23 ZVölkR 23–32 (1939)).
71. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 70, at 5; see also CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3–4 (1974); Luis Kutner, World Habeas
Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L. J. 525 (1964).
72. See SHEARER, supra note 68, at 12–13 (discussing and citing the Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Nov. 19, 1794 (entered into force Oct. 28, 1795),
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 27, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, also collected in I. BEVANS, 12 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13, W. MALLOY, 1
TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 590 (1910)); see also Treaty of Amiens, supra
note 69, art. 20.
73. See BILLOT, supra note 68, at 35–40. Billot, the Rédacteur for the Ministère des
Affaires Étrangères at the time, argued that the claimed examples of extradition in antiquity
were not really extradition at all. Those arguing that the claimed examples were evidence
of extradition in antiquity included FAUSTIN HÉLIE, TRAITÉ DE I’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE
Liv. II 16-9–72 (2d ed. 1866); Faustin Hélie, Du Droit Pénal dans ses Rapports avec le Droit des
Gens, 17 REVUE DE LÉGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 220 (1843); and PAUL BERNARD,
TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE I’EXTRADITION, vol. 2, 1, 60, 65 (1883).
74. E.g., A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 2 (1947); CHARLES
DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 243–45 (P. Corbett trans.,
1957). Some commentators have made the same argument about international law today.
See discussion on “the speciousness of the functional necessity argument,” in Christopher
L. Blakesley, Terrorism, Law, and Our Constitutional Order, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 471, 510
(1989).
75. E.g., HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, Libri Tres, at 526–29 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1964); JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 100–11 (1962).
Many of the examples proposed by these seventeenth-century scholars to indicate that
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in antiquity, motivated by the participants’ belief that they were
obligated by natural right [and obligation] and justice. Both sides
believed if extradition occurred, it had to have occurred by authority of “law,” although their vision of law differed. The positivist
school attacked Grotius’ examples of extradition in antiquity as
accidental happenings accomplished solely by force or coercion,
certainly not by authority of natural right.76 They also argued
extradition was not done out of an obligation stemming from the
solidarity of nations and the corresponding obligation to have
reciprocal rendition of fugitives.77 This positivistic argument
rested on a view that extradition does not exist unless it is motivated solely by the will of the sovereign, which they believed was
the only basis for all law.78
No doubt, extradition in antiquity and the Middle Ages was not
consistent or systematic. Some, but not a great deal of extradition
had “legality” (légalité) as its essence. However, extradition, authorized and legalized by treaties, did occur in antiquity.79 Individuals
were delivered up by one population at the treaty-based request of
another, not only for political offenses or acts of aggression against
the “sovereign,” but also for murder, rape, theft, robbery, abduction, and other common crimes.80
The Treaty of 1759 between France and Wurttemberg was the
prototype of the extradition treaty of the modern era.81 Extradiextradition was practiced in antiquity were presented primarily to prove that there was a
natural duty to extradite or prosecute all criminals.
76. See BILLOT, supra note 68, at 35–36 (arguing that the claimed examples of extradition did not show that occurred in antiquity; the examples were not really extradition at
all). These examples were argued to be evidence of extradition by HÉLIE, supra note 73, at
169–72; Hélie, supra note 73, at 235–36.
77. BILLOT, supra note 68, at 35–36; JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED 177, 189 (2d ed. 1861).
78. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 177, 189 (2d ed.
1861).
79. This is discussed by many commentators. See, e.g., SHEARER, supra note 68, at 5–7;
Langdon & Gardiner, supra note 70, at 192–94; BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION,
supra note 70, at 2–3.
80. See SHEARER, supra note 68, at 5–6; see also Paul O’Higgins’, The History of Extradition in British Practice, 13 INDIAN Y.B. OF INT’L AFF. 78, 108 (1964); 6 BRIT. DIG. OF INT’L L.
445 (1965).
81. 43 PARRY’S T.S. 243, discussed in SHEARER, supra note 68, at 7–11. This treaty is
usually cited as the prime example of the nascent modern extradition treaty. E.g.,
SHEARER, supra note 68, at 10, 17, 103; BASSIOUNI, Public Order, supra note 72, at 4–5;
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 70, at 2–5, noting that the
Treaty between France and Wurttemberg, on December 3, 1765, provides for the extradition of “brigands, malefactors, robbers, incendiaries, murderers, assassins, vagabonds, cavalry, infantrymen, dragoons and housards (light cavalry).”
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tion was still possible in these early treaties, however, for political
or military offenses and desertion from the armed forces as well as
for common crimes. Many of the rules and procedures established
in these conventions endure in the law of extradition to this day.
The rules required extradition requests to be made through the
diplomatic channel, or at least through specific frontier authorities. The nineteenth century appears to have brought in a new
phase of extradition law and practice, especially on the Continent,
where although the use of bilateral treaties did not decelerate,
states also began to promulgate domestic extradition laws.82
Judicial decisions in the United States were important in the
development of modern extradition law. Sir Edward Clark
betrayed his bias for the Anglo-American system of judicially developed law, when he extolled the value of the American influence:
In the matter of extradition, the American law was, until 1870,
better than that of any country in the world; and the decisions of
the American judges are the best existing expositions of the duty
of extradition, in its relations at once to the judicial rights of
nations and the general interests of the civilization of the
world.83

The first two general treaties between the United States and
Great Britain84 and the first between the United States and
82. MERLE & VITU, supra note 64, at 427 n.2, 428, § 319, indicating that Belgium was
the first to do this, in 1833. Then came England, 1870; Holland, 1875; Argentina, 1885;
Japan, 1887; Switzerland, 1892; Norway, 1907; Sweden, 1913; France, 1927; Germany, 1929.
The United States promulgated its extradition law in 1848, but it does not allow extradition
apart from a treaty. The French promulgated their Loi Relative a l’Extradition des Etrangers
[1927] D.P. IV, March 10, 1927 (la loi Renoult), reprinted in CODE DE PROCEDURE PÉNALE [C.
PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE], immediately after art. 696 (Fr.), and translated in
Harvard Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 380 (Supp. 1935).
83. SIR EDWARD CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 27–28 (4th ed.
1903); SHEARER, supra note 68, at 16.
84. The Jay Treaty, supra note 72, art. XXVII; SHEARER, supra note 68, at 13. A general
analysis of the Treaty is found in SAMUEL BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND
DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1962). Article 27 reads:
It is further agreed that His Majesty and the United States on mutual requisitions,
by them respectively, or by their respective Ministers or officers authorized to
make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with
murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any of the countries of the other, provided that this shall only be done
on such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the
fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and
commitment for trial, if the offense had there been committed. The expense of
such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make
the requisition and receive the fugitive.
See also Convention on Boundaries, the Slave Trade and Extradition (Webster-Ashburton
Treaty) art. 10, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 572, T.S. 119, 12 Bevans 82, 1 Malloy
650. This Treaty extended the list of extraditable offenses from murder and forgery, as in
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France85 adopted the law of extradition, as developed by the
French theoreticians and amended by American judges. These
treaties set the trend for the development of extradition law in the
United States.86 A surprising amount of the original process and
conceptualization of extradition persists today.87
With the emergence of the nation-state, the sovereign continued
to desire the rendition of criminals and “political” offenders. As
modern theories of criminal justice evolved, so did theories of
extradition. The notion that the relative power of sovereigns
required the extradition of fugitives gave way to the view that natural right and justice required extradition. Later, positivism served
to promote the concept that the “legality” of extradition is derived
from an extradition treaty, local legislation, or case law. While the
reigning legal philosophy has changed, this brief historical sketch
indicates that extradition has existed since antiquity and that the
role of extradition in society has remained relatively constant.88
B.

Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance, and Contemporary Practice

The historical exegesis above demonstrates that extradition and
mutual legal assistance have evolved over time—and through state
practice—as parts of a distinct area of international law on international cooperation in law enforcement matters. It is through these
two mechanisms that a great deal of international cooperation,
envisioned in the suppression conventions, takes place. As previously noted, therefore, one may rightfully regard extradition and
mutual legal assistance as the cornerstones of transnational criminal practice.89 The necessity of these mechanisms is evident. As
Prost notes, whatever informal tools for cooperation may exist,
“there will remain many instances where the type of assistance
the Jay Treaty, to include arson, piracy, robbery and uttering forged papers. SHEARER,
supra note 68, at 14.
85. Treaty of Extradition, Nov. 9, 1843, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 581, T.S. 89, Bevans 830, 1
Malloy 526. This was the first United States treaty to include a political offense clause. Id.
art. V. As evidenced by the 1889 Supplementary Convention to the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty, Extradition Convention, July 12, 1889, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 26 Stat. 1508, T.S. 139, 12
Bevans 211, the political offense clause was soon adopted as standard in United States
extradition treaties, Id. art. II.
86. See, e.g., 1978 Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany art. 2, 32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. 9785 (1978); Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed Oct.
21, 1986, 1120 U.N.T.S. 269 discussed in Marjory Nash Leich, “Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law,” 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 935 (1987).
87. SHEARER, supra note 68, at 14–15.
88. See authority in supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text.
89. See Stigall, supra note 50.
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sought can only be obtained through the use of formal mutual
assistance.”90 And extradition, in turn, is the principal means of
obtaining custody over a fugitive located in another territory.91
Extradition is an intrinsically formal process designed “to protect
basic international law norms” such as territorial sovereignty and
the basic rights of the extradited person.92 Extradition and mutual
legal assistance are also legally intensive areas of practice that
require familiarity with the domestic law of the requesting state (to
understand what evidence is needed and the form in which it is
needed); the international legal regime governing the request (to
understand which treaty is applicable and the requirements of that
treaty); and the law of the foreign country to which the request is
being made (to understand the needs of the courts in that jurisdiction and the particular way in which that country provides
assistance).93
C.

International Terrorism and Transnational Criminal Law

Transnational criminal law applies to a broad range of crime,
including terrorism. In that regard, certain acts of terrorism have
also been specifically addressed by suppression conventions. This
subset of suppression conventions are collectively called the terrorism suppression conventions, the universal counter-terrorism conventions, or, alternatively, the anti-terrorism conventions. The first
such convention was the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (the first such convention).94 Numerous others developed after the enactment of that
seminal instrument.95 Currently, there are approximately thirteen
terrorism suppression conventions, all of which oblige states to
criminalize a certain manifestation of terrorist activity, ensure
offenders are held accountable, and cooperate with other member
states in the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of that cer90. See PROST, supra note 51, at 93.
91. See Margaret L. Satterhwaite, Transfer of Persons in the Fight Against terrorism, in
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED LEGAL ORDER: MEETING THE CHALLENGES
608 (Larissa Van Den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds., 2013).
92. See id.
93. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 53, at 95.
94. Daniel O’Donnell, International Treaties Against Terrorism and the Use of Terrorism
During Armed Conflict and by Armed Forces, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, Dec. 2006, at 854, https://
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_864_odonnell.pdf.
95. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO THE UNIVERSAL ANTITERRORISM CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS 2–3, V.03-85663(E) (2003), http://www.unodc
.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/explanatory_english2.pdf.
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tain type of terrorist activity.96 “They cover topics as disparate as
detection markers in plastic explosives and the prevention and
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons.”97
Through the series of Terrorism Suppression Conventions,
states have co-operated to suppress the kind of violent conduct
that is criminalized in most domestic jurisdictions, coupled with
an added element of (i) prohibited means or method (bombing, hostage taking, hijacking, shipjacking, or use of transport of
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons); (ii) prohibited target
(internationally protected persons, civil aircraft, international
airports, maritime navigation, fixed platforms on the continental shelf, or civilians); or some combination thereof.98

Iraq and many other countries in the Middle East and North
Africa are parties to the majority of these terrorism suppression
conventions, most of which provide for international cooperation
in criminal matters. And, like other suppression conventions, the
terrorism suppression conventions each require state parties to
either extradite or prosecute offenders found within their territory.99 For instance, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on December 14, 1973, states in its preamble
that one of its undergirding objectives is to “enhance international
cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective and
practical measures for the prevention of [terrorist bombings].”100
The Convention goes on to impose obligations to either extradite
or punish those accused of terrorist bombings101 and requires that
states provide each other “the greatest measure of assistance” in
the investigation of such crimes.102
Similarly, the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on December 17, 1979, states in its preamble that its genesis is
rooted in the belief “that it is urgently necessary to develop international cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention, prosecution, and punishment of
all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terror96. See KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 9
(2011).
97. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 95, at 5.
98. TRAPP, supra note 96, at 18–19.
99. See id. at 83.
100. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings pmbl., Jan.
12, 1998, S. Treaty Doc. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
101. Id. art. 7.
102. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art. 11, Dec. 17, 1979,
11081 T.I.A.S. i, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
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ism.”103 The Convention goes on to impose obligations to either
extradite or punish those accused of terrorist bombings and
requires that states provide each other “the greatest measure of
assistance” in the investigation of such crimes.104
Still, it is important to emphasize that although they are sometimes termed “universal,” not every Middle Eastern or North African country is a party to every terrorism suppression convention.
For example, neither Jordan nor Lebanon is yet party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,105
leaving a lacuna in the international cooperation regime for such
crimes vis-à-vis those countries. And many other such lacunae
exist. For instance, Jordan has even noted, in its reservation to the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism that, because it is not a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation; or the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf, “it is not bound to include, in the application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, the offences within the scope and as
defined in such Treaties.”106 Similarly, a review of the chart at
Appendix A of key multilateral conventions and their status among
Middle Eastern and North African countries reveals multiple gaps
in adherence to the patchwork of treaties that focus on international cooperation and the suppression of terrorism.
D.

The League of Arab States Conventions

Aside from the multilateral treaties outlined above, there are
also regional treaties, such as those in the Middle East, which provide for international cooperation in criminal matters. Two of the
most significant of these107 are treaties under the auspices of the
103. Id. pmbl.
104. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note
100, art. 10.
105. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra
note 100, 2149 U.N.T.S. at 258–59; SARAH WILLIAMS HYBRID AND INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: SELECTED JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 370 n.279 (2012).
106. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec.
9, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-49, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
107. A number of other regional instruments on counterterrorism are also in force in
the Middle East. For instance, the Cooperation Council for the Arab State of the Gulf
(GCC) Convention Against Terrorism, which provides in Article 19 that “Contracting
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League of Arab States. The League of Arab States (or, as it is sometimes called, the Arab League) was founded in 1945.108 It is “a
loose confederation of twenty-two Arab nations, including Palestine,”109 whose purpose is “the strengthening of the relations
between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in
order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their
independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the
affairs and interests of the Arab countries[.]”110 Member states of
the Arab League transcend the geographic parameters of the Middle East and North Africa, including countries from those regions
as well as in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The Arab League
today consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen.111
A notable treaty that exists among members of the League of
Arab States is the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation
of 1983 (the Riyadh Agreement)—a multilateral agreement which
provides for a broad range of international legal cooperation in
both civil and criminal matters.112 With regard to cooperation in
States shall undertake to extradite persons accused or convicted of terrorist offences in a
Contracting State and whose extradition is sought by that State in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention,” and, in Article 25, that “Contracting States shall undertake
to act, to the extent possible, on any rogatory commission relating to criminal proceedings
connected with a terrorist offence, in accordance with the Convention adopted by the
member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on the enforcement of judgements, rogatory commissions and notifications.” See Cooperation Council
for the Arab States of the Gulf, Convention against terrorism (2004), Articles 19 and 25.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference also has a multilateral convention which, in
Article 5, states that “Contracting States shall undertake to extradite those indicted or convicted of terrorist crimes, requested for extradition by any of these countries in compliance
with the rules and conditions stipulated in this Convention,” and, in Article 9, states that
“Each Contracting State shall request from any other Contracting State to undertake in its
territory rogatory action with respect to any judicial procedures concerning an action
involving a terrorist crime[.]” See Organization of the Islamic Conference, Convention of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism
(1999), Articles 5 and 9.
108. See League of Arab States, http://www.arableagueonline.org/ (last visited June 16,
2015).
109. Jonathan Masters & Mohammed Aly Sergie, The Arab League, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/arab-league/
p25967.
110. League of Arab States Charter, art. 2, May 7, 1999, http://www.arableagueonline
.org/charter-arab-league/.
111. See Presentation of the Arab League, ARAB LEAGUE ONLINE (July 3, 2015 12:21 PM),
http://www.arableagueonline.org/hello-world/#more-1.
112. See League of Arab States, Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, April
6, 1983, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html.
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criminal matters, the Riyadh Agreement provides, among other
things, for the exchange of criminal records,113 the use of rogatory
commissions “to undertake on its behalf in the latter’s territory any
judicial procedure”114 (which includes taking the testimony of witnesses),115 and the extradition of fugitives.116
Another key treaty among Arab League countries is the Arab
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Signed in 1998 and
entered into force the following year,117 this convention applies to
a range of conduct—beyond the conduct-specific foci of most
other terrorism suppression conventions—and seeks to suppress
terrorism and define it more generally. The Arab Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorism defines terrorism as follows:
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes,
that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective
criminal agenda, causing terror among people, causing fear by
harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public
or private installations or property or to occupy or to seize them,
or aiming to jeopardize a national resource.118

The convention further provides that parties to the treaty “shall
undertake to extradite those indicted for or convicted of terrorist
offences whose extradition is requested by any of these States in
accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated in this Convention.”119 It likewise provides that “[e]ach contracting State shall
provide the other States with all possible and necessary assistance
for investigations or prosecutions relating to terrorist offences.”120
Accordingly, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism contains provisions for mutual legal assistance and extradition
for matters which fall within its scope.
Although the Arab League instruments have faced challenges in
implementation, they are becoming an increasingly important part
of the transnational criminal firmament. Though commentators
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. art. 5.
Id. arts. 14, 15(2).
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 38.
See AMNESTY INT’L, THE ARAB CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM: A
SERIOUS THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2002), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
IOR51/001/2002/en/c2325833-d8a7-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/ior510012002en.pdf (noting the treaty entered into force on May 7, 1999, one month after the seventh ratification
by a member state of the Arab League).
118. League of Arab States, The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism,
art. 1(2), 1998, https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf.
119. Id. art. 5.
120. Id. art. 13.
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note that bilateral cooperation between Arab countries is generally
preferred to cooperation through multilateral mechanisms,121
instances of cooperation among Arab League member states
against terrorism (and other transnational criminal matters) have
included judicial cooperation under the Riyadh Convention.122
E.

Summary

Transnational criminal law is a rapidly developing subcategory of
international law which addresses crime that transcends national
frontiers and the mechanisms used by states to cooperate in its
investigation or prosecution. The key treaties, which comprise the
core of transnational criminal law—the suppression conventions—
generally contain provisions calling for the suppression of a specific crime and allowing for mutual legal assistance and extradition
between states. Other conventions, however, such as the Arab
League Conventions, may be more regional in focus and more
expansive in scope. Others still may be bilateral conventions with
applicability for a wide range of offenses, but that only apply
between two countries. And, of course, domestic legislation may
also permit international cooperation in the absence of a treaty.
This area of law permits and shapes international cooperation
across a wide range of criminal activity, including terrorism. But
many acts of terrorism may also be addressed under another subcategory of international law—the law of armed conflict—and/or
the even more specific subcategory of “armed conflict not of a noninternational character.”123 This area of law will be discussed infra.
IV.

CONFLICT

AND

CONVENTIONS: DETERMINING APPLICABILITY

It is worth noting that none of the terrorism suppression conventions contain language making them inapplicable during armed
conflict. There is language addressing military activity, but it does
not preclude the application of the conventions altogether during
121. See James Cockayne, Jason Ipe & Alistair Millar, Implementing the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy in North Africa, CTR. ON GLOB. COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION 18 (Sept.
2010), https://www.eisf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/0072-Cockayne-Ipe-Millar-2010Implementing-the-UN-Global-Counter-Terrorism-Strategy-in-North-Africa.pdf (noting that
the tendency of Arab regimes “to ‘jealously guard’ security management and their mutual
suspicion, which generates a preference for more discrete bilateral cooperation in
counterterrorism matters, [has] limited the ability of the [Arab League] to serve as a
forum for stimulating critical information sharing and other forms of cooperation among
countries in North Africa and the rest of the Arab world.”).
122. Id. at 21.
123. See David E. Graham, Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult
Task, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 43, 44 (2012).
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times of conflict. Military activity is addressed, for instance, in the
1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, in Article 19(2):
The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those
terms are understood under international humanitarian law,
which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a
State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are
governed by other rules of international law, are not governed
by this Convention.124

Such provisions, however, merely exclude the applicability of the
relevant convention to the activities of “armed forces during an
armed conflict” and “military forces of a State in the exercise of
their official duties.”125 Such language does not displace the relevant provisions of a convention in their entirety during a time of
armed conflict. Instead, Article 1(4) of the Convention expressly
states that the military forces envisioned are those organized forces
under the command of a State126—so non-state armed groups like
ISIS clearly remain included among those against which its provisions can be used. Importantly, such language does not state that
the conventions themselves do not apply during an armed conflict.
If the text of the treaties contains no such self-limiting provisions
that would curtail their application during a time of armed conflict, then one must look elsewhere for any potential limitation of
that sort. In that regard, the central legal concept to understanding when various rules are operative or suppressed is the principle
of lex specialis. The Latin maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali (the
more specific rule prevails over the general rule) is an interpretive
method that exists in Western legal systems, most notably in continental civil law systems based on the Roman model.127 This
maxim, also phrased as specialia generalibus derogant,128 is most frequently used in modern international law by its shortened form lex
specialis and, in that context, denotes the idea that a specific rule
prevails over a more general rule.129

124. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note
100, art. 19(2).
125. Id.
126. Id. art. 1(4).
127. See EVA STEINER, THE FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 70 (2002).
128. See id.
129. See NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS
239 (2010).
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Although a feature of civil law systems for centuries,130 commentators have noted that the idea of lex specialis only recently gained
prominence as an international legal concept.131 Even so, as logical method of legal interpretation, the idea has existed in international law since its early formation132 and has been present in
international jurisprudence for almost a century.133 Both the Permanent Court of International Justice and, later, the International
Court of Justice issued rulings recognizing this canon of construction as applicable in international law.134 Lex specialis, therefore,
was imported from civil law into international jurisprudence
almost contemporaneously with the advent of modern international courts.
As civil law scholar Professor R.J. Trahan observes when
expounding on the core concept of lex specialis, this method of
interpretation is one of the principal tools used in civil law systems
for reconciling “legislative antimonies.”135 In the context of international law, this can be extended to reconciling conflicting treaty
provisions and conflicting rules of customary international law.
Lubell notes that there are a number of ways to implement lex
specialis: “[f]or instance as a conflict resolving tool for choosing
130. See THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 854 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger, eds., Alan
Watson trans., 2011) (quoting Papinian, a Roman jurist who wrote in the late 2nd and
early 3rd Century, as describing this canon of interpretation as already being well established during his time: “There is no doubt that in all other [aspects] of the law the particular derogates from the general[.]”); see also J.R. Trahan, Time for a Change: A Call to Reform
Louisiana’s Intertemporal Conflicts Law (Law of Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REV. 661, 707
(1999) (noting that the principle is an “ancient maxim of statutory construction[.]”).
131. See Marko Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens David Ohlin ed., forthcoming) (manuscript
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957) (“despite the Latin veneer of antiquity,”
the principle of lex specialis has only come to prominence since the ICJ’s 1996 Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion”).
132. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOPIC
(A): THE FUNCTION AND SCOPE OF THE LEX SPECIALIS RULE AND THE QUESTION OF ‘SELFCONTAINED REGIMES’ 4 (2004), http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf (noting that its rationale was expressed in the writings of Grotius).
133. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos.
20/21, at 30 (July 12) (“The special words, according to elementary principles of interpretation, control the general expressions.”); Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v.
India), 1960 I.C.J. 44 (Apr. 12) (“Where therefore the Court finds a practice clearly established between two States which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations
between them, the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice for the purpose of
determining their specific rights and obligations. Such a particular practice must prevail
over any general rules.”).
134. Payment of Various Serbian Loans, 1929 P.C.I.J. at 30; Passage Over Indian Territory 1960 I.C.J. at 44.
135. Trahan, supra note 130, at 708.
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one rule over another (lex specialis derogat legi generali), as a complimentary approach (lex specialis complementa), or as a method advocating use of the specific rule as an interpretive tool for the general
one.”136 In addition, the maxim does not apply at all where the
special provision covers situations not covered by the general.137
The importance of this method of deconfliction becomes clear
when one observes the collision course in the development of two
areas of international law: international human rights law and the
law of armed conflict.
A.

Lex Specialis, the Law of Armed Conflict, and International
Human Rights Law

The law of armed conflict is defined as “that part of international
law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.”138 Scholars
typically divide the law of armed conflict into the subcategories of
jus ad bellum (the law regulating when the use of military force is
permissible); jus in bello (the law regulating how military force is
employed during an armed conflict); and jus post bellum (the law
regulating post-conflict activities).139 As a general matter, the law
of armed conflict permits any level of lethal and destructive force
to be used for lawful military objectives (one which, by its location,
nature, purpose, or use, is such that its destruction offers a military
advantage),140 so long as the “incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
[ ] would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”141 As a general rule, anyone engaging
in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to that conflict may be similarly targeted.142 The law of armed conflict,
accordingly, permits large-scale killing and destruction—even of
innocent civilians—so long as the direct target is a lawful military
136. LUBELL, supra note 129, at 239.
137. Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France For the Act of Things: A Study of Judicial
Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REV. 1299, 1356 (1988).
138. U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (Maj. Andrew Gillman & Maj. William
Johnson, eds. 2012), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2014
.pdf.
139. See Serena K. Sharma, Reconsidering the Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello Distinction, in JUS
POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE (Carsten Stahn &
Jann K. Kleffner, eds. 2008) at 9. See also U.S. ARMY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 10
(Maj. Andrew Gillman & Maj. William Johnson, eds. 2012).
140. Id. at 137.
141. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(5)(b),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
142. See LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 139, at 138–39.
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target and consequent civilian deaths are incidental and
“proportional.”143
International human rights law (IHRL), in some contrast to the
law of armed conflict, is a field of international law which has rapidly developed since the end of World War II144 and that seeks to
grant individuals throughout the world certain basic rights.145
Among these are “the inherent right to life,” enshrined in Article 6
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).146 The conflict between these two areas of law—and
what each requires with regard to human lives—is obvious.
The discord between these two fields of law set the stage for a
defining moment for the concept of lex specialis. This came in
1994, when the United Nations General Assembly, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations,
requested that the International Court of Justice render an advisory opinion on the following question: “Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”147
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus
whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation
of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided
by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.148

Since that decision, lex specialis, as a canon of statutory interpretation, began to take on new meaning in the distinct context of
international law, and to some extent became understood as a
regime-eclipsing (as opposed to rule-eclipsing) doctrine. This had
a unique impact on international human rights law, as some commentators began to assert that international human rights law had
143. Id. at 34–35.
144. See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and
Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 590 (2006); see also DAN E. STIGALL, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE COMPARATIVE LAW OF INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 9–10 (2009).
145. René Provost, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 18 (2005).
146. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
147. Request for Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
1994 I.C.J. 2 (Dec. 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7646.pdf.
148. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 ¶ 25 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
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no place whatsoever during an armed conflict as it was the applicable lex specialis in that context. This position was temporarily
adopted by the United States, which maintained for a time that the
law of armed conflict, as a lex specialis, “applies in lieu of international human rights law.”149 More recent U.S. government publications, however, acknowledge a shift in the U.S. position such that it
now recognizes that certain provisions of international human
rights law remain applicable during an armed conflict and that a
more appropriate rule-by-rule analysis is required to determine
which rule prevails. In that regard, in its Fourth Periodic Report to
the U.N. Human Rights Committee on compliance with the
ICCPR, the United States clarified its position as follows:
Under the doctrine of lex specialis, the applicable rules for the
protection of individuals and conduct of hostilities in armed
conflict are typically found in [LOAC]. . . . [IHRL] and [LOAC]
are in many respects complementary and mutually reinforcing
[and] contain many similar protections. Determining the international law rule that applies to a particular action taken by a
government in the context of an armed conflict is a fact-specific
determination, which cannot be easily generalized, and raises
especially complex issues in the context of non-international
armed conflicts . . . .150

Per the U.S. Army Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, this statement suggests the appropriate analysis is “rule by rule” and, in “situations of armed conflict, where the LOAC provides specific
guidance, these will displace competing norms of IHRL and provide authoritative guidance for military action. Where the LOAC is
silent or its guidance inadequate, specific provisions of applicable
human rights law may supplement the LOAC.”151 Thus, where the
law of armed conflict is silent, it cannot eclipse a competing rule.
And, as demonstrated below, there are many areas where the law of
armed conflict is silent. Given the far-reaching nature and purpose
of international law, it is no surprise that one of its more narrowly
149. See LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 139, at 198.
150. Id. at 198–99 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES FOURTH PERIODIC
REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ¶ 507 (2011), http://www
.state.gov/g/drl/rls/179781.htm).
151. Id.; see also Yoram Dinstein, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 226 (2015) (“It would nevertheless be wrong to view [the law of non-international armed conflict] and human rights law as incompatible, monolithic regimes,
scanning them solely on the macro level. When considered on the micro level, it becomes
apparent that a perception of [the law of non-international armed conflict] and human
rights law as ‘mutually exclusive’ is a fallacy. The interaction between the two legal regimes
is nuanced, and it ought to be considered in terms of coexistence, lex specialis, derogation
and limitation.”) (citations omitted).
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focused subsets does not purport to regulate every aspect of state
or human conduct. Thus, far from the normal binary analysis pitting the law of armed conflict against international human rights
law, the multifaceted aspect of international law and its various subsets make the analysis polychotomous in nature. Some subcategories of international law will be in conflict with others; some will be
complementary to others; some will be mutually reinforcing; and
yet others will neither border nor abrade other legal regimes—they
simply occupy a more liminal space in the international legal universe, like tendrils which grow and curl into complex formations
but never touch or intertwine.
V.

THE LAW

OF

NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

As noted, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have been classified as
non-international armed conflicts.152 Non-international armed
conflicts are defined as “armed confrontations occurring within
the territory of a single State and in which the armed forces of no
other State are engaged against the central government.”153 In
addition, in the words of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, a non-international armed conflict exists
when there is “protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State.”154 As military publications, research institutions,
152. UNAMI Report, supra note 18, at i. See also Dinstein, supra note 151, at 18 (noting
that the conflict ongoing in Syria since 2011 is a non-international armed conflict).
153. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 2 (2006), http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20
Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf. See also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW
OF WAR MANUAL 73–74 (June 2015), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Law-of-War-ManualJune-2015.pdf (“3.3.1 International Armed Conflict and Non-International Armed Conflict. The law of war treats situations of “war,” “hostilities,” or “armed conflict” differently
based on the legal status of parties to the conflict. If two or more States oppose one
another, then this type of armed conflict is known as an “international armed conflict”
because it takes place between States. However, a state of war can exist when States are not
on opposite sides of the conflict. These other types of conflict are described as “not of an
international character” or “noninternational armed conflict.” For example, two non-State
armed groups warring against one another or States warring against non-State armed
groups may be described as “non-international armed conflict,” even if international borders are crossed in the fighting.”).
154. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) (“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law
applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal con-
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and commentators uniformly note, non-international armed conflicts comprise the bulk of global conflict in the modern world.155
While the international legal rules governing such conflicts are
thinner than those pertaining to international conflicts,156 a core
group of international legal principles still applies to non-international armed conflict. This subgroup of the law of armed conflict
is known, descriptively, as the law of non-international armed
conflict.157
The law of non-international armed conflict consists of both
treaty and customary international law. With regard to treaty-based
law, the existing body of law is substantively thin, consisting mainly
of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions.158 Also applicable, albeit more narrowly, are thematic conventions such as the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property.159 Each of these treaty-based bodies
of law, however, only becomes applicable in different, context-specific situations.
flicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian
law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal
conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat
takes place there.”).
155. See Dinstein, supra note 151, at 2 (“NIACs are certainly much more pervasive today
than international armed conflicts[.]”). See also LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra
note 139, at 25; see also Uppsala Universitet Conflict Encyclopedia, http://www.ucddp.uu
.se (noting the prominence of non-international armed conflict).
156. Id. at 26 (noting that there is less international legal regulation of such conflicts
due to their internal nature. “[T]he internal nature of these conflicts explains the limited
scope of international regulation.”).
157. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 153, at 2–3. See also Dinstein, supra note 151, at 3
(“Since [1949], the international regulation of [non-international armed conflicts] has
undergone tremendous growth, becoming the fulcrum of contemporary interest. In large
measure, the normative corpus apposite to [non-international armed conflicts] may be
seen as an extrapolation of the more robust jus in bello applicable in [international armed
conflicts].”).
158. Sasha Radin, Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 696, 705 (2013).
159. Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict,
22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219, 223 (2011), http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/1/219.full;
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art.
19(1), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 256 (“In the event of an armed conflict not of an
international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as, a minimum, the provisions of the
present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.”). Aside from Additional
Protocol II and Common Article 3, Dinstein delineates a number of other treaties which
are applicable to non-international armed conflicts, such as the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property; the Convention on Certain Chemical Weapons; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 2006 International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention;
and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. See Dinstein, supra note 151, at 154–61.
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Common Article 3 applies “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties,”160 and establishes basic rules that govern the conduct of parties to such a conflict. These are “fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted.”161 They
include requirements for humane treatment of persons not
actively participating in the conflict (including armed forces which
have surrendered or are hors de combat).162 The article specifically prohibits, with regard to such persons, “violence to life and
person,” including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.163 It also prohibits the taking of hostages,164 outrages upon
human dignity,165 and the imposition of sentences and executions
without the judgment of a regularly constituted court with appropriate judicial guarantees.166 In addition, Common Article 3 provides that “the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for,”
and that “[a]n” impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict.”167
Additional Protocol II, in turn, is a supplement to Common Article 3 and provides more specific protections for civilians. These
include, like Common Article 3, protections against “violence to
the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment,” as well as “taking of
hostages.”168 Additional Protocol 2 also extends protections to
include prohibitions against collective punishments,169 acts of terrorism,170 outrages upon personal dignity—in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
160. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
161. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMM. RED
CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/
geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm.
162. Geneva Convention III, supra note 160, art. 3(1).
163. Id. art. 3(1)(a).
164. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
165. Id. art. 3(1)(c).
166. Id. art. 3(1)(d).
167. Id. art. 3(2).
168. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
169. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
170. Id. art. 4(2)(d).

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\48-1\JLE101.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 33

20-OCT-15

Transnational Criminal Law During Armed Conflicts

15:05

33

form of indecent assault,171 slavery and the slave trade,172 pillage,173
and threats to commit any of the prohibited acts.174 Sandesh
Sivakumaran notes that “Additional Protocol II, still the only treaty
devoted solely to the law of internal armed conflict, represents a
pared-back version of what had been hoped for and its sparse text
betrays its nature as a last-minute compromise.”175
Other conventions, such as the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property, serve to protect “movable or
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of
every people”176 during times of conflict (both international and
non-international).177
Which of these instruments applies to the non-international
armed conflict in question depends, in large part, on the circumstances of the conflict and the level of violence. For instance, in
situations of low-intensity violence (protests, isolated violence,
riots, or banditry), the threshold for a non-international armed
conflict would not be met.178 Once the requisite level of violence is
attained, however, different legal obligations will apply depending
on the organization of the groups involved and the extent to which
such groups control territory.179
Common Article 3 merely requires that the armed conflict not
be of “an international character” and occur “in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties”. However, the threshold is
higher under Additional Protocol II. By Article 1.1, the Protocol only applies to conflicts between the armed forces of a High
Contracting Party “and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of the territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations” though it
171. Id. art. 4(2)(e).
172. Id. art. 4(2)(f).
173. Id. art. 4(2)(g).
174. Id. art. 4(2)(h).
175. Sivakumaran, supra note 159, at 223.
176. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 242.
177. Id. at 256 (“In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character
occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention
which relate to respect for cultural property.”).
178. Dinstein, supra note 151, at 21 (“Internal disturbances—not reaching the level of
a NIAC—encompass disorderly demonstrations, rallies, and protests. These events may be
large-scale and rife with violence, perhaps inflicting incalculable human fatalities and/or
colossal damage to property, but they do not become a NIAC as long as they are isolated
and sporadic, i.e. they are not coordinated and sustained over a stretch of time.”). See also
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 139, at 26.
179. Dinstein, supra note 151, at 21.
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is possible for there to be an intern-connection between two separate conflicts, as in those of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The
Article further requires, as does Common Article 3, that the conflict take place “in the territory of a High Contracting Party.”180

In addition, given the relatively thin body of treaty law governing
non-international armed conflicts, customary international law
plays a particularly important role in their regulation. Notably,
some protections initially developed for international armed conflicts have now attained the status of customary international law
and apply equally in both international and non-international
armed conflict. For instance, the principle of proportionality
applies in non-international armed conflict, such that it would be a
violation of international law to carry out a disproportionate attack
in such a context.181 Such protections also include the prohibition
on targeting civilians (individuals who are not members of the
armed forces or an organized armed group);182 attacking civilian
objects;183 indiscriminate attacks that strike both military objectives
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction; the prohibition
on acts designed to cause unnecessary suffering;184 and the
requirements of humane treatment.185
The law of non-international armed conflict, therefore, contains
provisions that are significant but rudimentary when compared to
the far more elaborate and expansive rules pertaining to international armed conflicts. Importantly, however, as the analysis below
demonstrates, no part of the law of armed conflict purports to
completely eclipse transnational criminal law or the multilateral
conventions that provide for mutual legal assistance and extradi180. SCHMIDTT, ET AL., supra note 153, at 3.
181. See id. at 22 (“An attack is forbidden if it may be expected to cause incidental loss
to civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. It is recognised that incidental injury to civilians and collateral damage to civilian
objects may occur as a result of a lawful attack against fighters or military objectives.”).
182. Additional Protocol I, supra note 141, art. 51(3); see also Michael N. Schmitt, The
Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 294 (2014) (explaining that
the Additional Protocol I “bans attacks on civilian objects”).
183. SCHMIDTT, ET AL., supra note 153, at 18.
184. Id. at 8.
185. Id. Dinstein notes that, “Since the 1990s we have witnessed the inexorable emergence of a new customary [law of non-international armed conflict], going well beyond
existing treaty law and in fact filling some of its gaps.” See Dinstein, supra note 151, at 205.
Dinstein goes on to identify a number of international legal norms which have become
part of the customary law of non-international armed conflict, such as the protection of
civilians; the prohibition against forced displacement of civilians; the prohibition on collective punishments; the prohibition of rape; the prohibition of slavery; and the injunction
against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Id. at 207–08.
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tion in terrorism and other forms of transnational crime. In fact,
the law of armed conflict actually envisions the two fields
coexisting.
A.

Comparing Transnational Criminal Law with
the Law of Armed Conflict

As noted, multilateral suppression conventions comprise an
important part of the fabric of transnational criminal law, including for cases involving international terrorism. Some of the conduct envisioned in these suppression conventions, however,
address conduct similar to what one might encounter during an
armed conflict. For instance, the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 15, 1997 (the Terrorist
Bombing Convention) applies to cases in which an offender
“unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place
of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility” with the “intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury”; or to cause “extensive destruction
of such a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in
or is likely to result in major economic loss.”186 The treaty also
applies to groups of persons acting with a common purpose to
detonate an explosive or other lethal device in such a fashion.187
Importantly, the treaty calls for state parties to provide international cooperation in the prosecution of such offenses188 and,
where applicable, provides that state parties may use the treaty as a
legal basis for extradition of persons accused of offenses involving
terrorist bombings.189 There is, therefore, an intersection in the
conduct addressed by transnational criminal instruments like the
terrorism suppression conventions and conduct that is characteristic of contemporary armed conflicts.
The intersection between the law of armed conflict and transnational criminal law is not limited solely to the types of conduct each
could potentially address. The law of armed conflict also contains
some treaty-based provisions which call for mutual legal assistance
and extradition, though only in very specific circumstances. For
186. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note
100, art. 2(1).
187. Id. art. 2(3)(c).
188. Id. art. 10.
189. Id. art. 9.
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instance, each of the Geneva Conventions contains a common
extradition provision, which uniformly states:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.190

Although the language of these provisions focuses on extradition, the Commentary to Additional Protocol I notes that “[t]he
principle of mutual assistance is certainly implied in the common
article of the Conventions which makes grave breaches subject to
universal jurisdiction, even though the conditions and modalities
of such mutual assistance are determined by the law of the Contracting Party to whom the request is made.”191 As the shared text
of these articles makes clear, however, the obligations imposed by
the Geneva Conventions only relate to those persons who have
committed “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions.192 Those,
in turn, are generally defined as willful killing; torture or inhuman
treatment (including biological experiments); willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive
destruction of property not justified by military necessity; compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile
power; willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the
rights of a fair trial; unlawful deportation, transfer, or confinement
of a civilian; and taking civilians as hostages.193
To the extent the common extradition articles of the Geneva
Conventions might be argued to have a preclusive effect on any
190. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [Geneva Convention I] art. 49, ¶ 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art.
50, ¶ 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II];
Geneva Convention III, supra note 160, art. 129, ¶ 2; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, ¶ 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
191. Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, INT’L COMM. RED
CROSS 1028, ¶ 3573 (1987), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf [hereinafter Commentary to AP I].
192. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 190, art. 49, ¶ 2; Geneva Convention II, supra
note 190, art. 50, ¶ 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 160, art. 129, ¶ 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 190, art. 146, ¶ 2.
193. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art.
2(a)-(h), S.C. Res. 1877 (July 7, 2009).
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other treaty or legal regime, it must first be noted that nothing in
the text of the relevant article states that it applies to the exclusion
of any other treaty or law. Moreover, it must be remembered that
the common extradition articles are all part of the “penal sanctions” portions of the Geneva Conventions, which were designed to
compel member states to adapt their national laws to enable the
prosecution before domestic or international courts of those who
committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.194 These
provisions also were designed to impose an “active duty”195 to
search for violators and impose an aut dedere aut judicare (extradite
or prosecute) requirement on countries where offenders are
found.196 These are obligations that states are meant to uphold in
times of peace as well as during times of armed conflict. Neither
the text of the common extradition articles nor Pictet’s commentary, however, indicate that these provisions should displace any
other set of rules.197 In fact, as the travaux of the Geneva Conventions demonstrates, the articles relating to penal sanctions and
enforcement were designed to ensure there were appropriate
mechanisms inserted into the domestic laws of the High Contracting Parties so that the Conventions could be properly
enforced.198 The goal was to require the High Contracting parties
to augment their existing penal provisions, not to supplant provisions of any other kind.
Reinforcing this analysis are the provisions of Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva
Convention IV) which expressly state that the rules Geneva Convention IV sets forth for civilians during a time of conflict do not
194. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 190, art. 146; Commentary on Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://
www.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600168?OpenDocument (last visited July 12, 2015).
195. See JEAN DE PREAUX ET AL., COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 623 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960).
196. See id.
197. It is also worth noting that U.S. jurisprudence supports this view. See Noriega v.
Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. Fla. 2009) (“Nowhere, however, is it suggested
that a prisoner of war may not be extradited from one party to the Convention to face
criminal charges in another. Nor do the stated purposes of articles 118 and 119, as
reflected by their commentary, preclude detention in these circumstances: article 118 is
intended to prohibit ‘prolong[ed] war captivity,’ while article 119 unambiguously reflects
the intention of the drafters to permit detention of prisoners of war subject to criminal
proceedings.”).
198. Fourth Report drawn up by the Special Committee of the Joint Committee,
Report on penal sanctions in case of violation of the Convention, page 116 (“The Conference is not making international penal law but is undertaking to insert in the national
penal laws certain acts enumerated as grave breaches of the Convention, which will
become crimes when they have been inserted into the national penal laws.”).
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constitute an obstacle to extradition of civilians pursuant to extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak of hostilities.199
Of course, the Geneva Conventions were authored before the
ascendance of transnational criminal law and the pluriverse of
bilateral and multilateral treaties that regulate transnational crime.
More recent instruments, therefore, are a better lens through
which to view the potential interaction between the law of armed
conflict and transnational criminal law. Authored roughly two
decades after the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions provides language that more broadly
addresses possible international cooperation during armed conflict. Article 88, notably entitled “Mutual assistance in criminal
matters,” provides a more expansive set of rules on the matter:
1. The High Contracting Parties shall afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol.
2. Subject to the rights and obligations established in the Conventions and in Article 85, paragraph 1, of this Protocol, and
when circumstances permit, the High Contracting Parties shall
co-operate in the matter of extradition. They shall give due consideration to the request of the State in whose territory the
alleged offence has occurred.
3. The law of the High Contracting Party requested shall apply
in all cases. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall
not, however, affect the obligations arising from the provisions
of any other treaty of a bilateral or multilateral nature which
governs or will govern the whole or part of the subject of mutual
assistance in criminal matters.200

While, as with the Geneva Conventions, the focus of these provisions in Additional Protocol I is on those who commit “grave
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, it is this provision that most
clearly demonstrates that transnational criminal law is not displaced by the law of armed conflict. Similar to the provisions of
Geneva Convention IV discussed above vis-à-vis extradition, the language of Additional Protocol I expressly states that even the more
expansive article for international cooperation in Additional Protocol I does not “affect the obligations arising from the provisions of
199. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Geneva, 12 August 1949, Articles 45 and 70. See also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR
MANUAL 637 (June 2015), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015
.pdf (“The [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners] does not prohibit
the extradition of POWs to other Parties to the [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners] to face criminal charges.”).
200. Additional Protocol I, supra note 141, art. 88.
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any other treaty of a bilateral or multilateral nature which governs
or will govern the whole or part of the subject of mutual assistance
in criminal matters.”201 And, as the Commentary to Article 88
makes clear, this article envisions “[m]utual assistance for criminal
proceedings conducted in another country, such as the notification of documents, tracing evidence, handing over files and documents, conducting searches etc. It may also concern handing over
the prosecution or the execution of foreign criminal judgments.”202 Accordingly, the law of armed conflict—as reflected in
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I—does not serve
to displace transnational criminal law or the treaties which comprise it; the two regimes are agnostic to one another in large part
and, at their closest points of intersection, complementary.
Importantly, however, neither the extradition articles of the
Geneva Conventions nor those in Additional Protocol I are clearly
applicable during non-international armed conflict.203 The evidence that the extradition and mutual legal assistance provisions
have risen to the level of customary international law is scant and
commentators suggest that these provisions are applicable solely to
international conflicts.204 This means that the weight of authority
suggests that the extradition provisions of the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol I have no applicability whatsoever to noninternational armed conflicts. Accordingly, in non-international
armed conflicts, there is no regime competing against transnational criminal law at all—and not even the possibility of asserting
that the law of armed conflict eclipses the extradition and mutual
legal assistance provisions of another convention. Under such circumstances, transnational criminal law and multilateral treaties
clearly remain applicable.

201. Id.
202. Commentary to AP I, supra note 191, at 1028, ¶ 3572.
203. See Ferdinandusse, supra note 49 (“The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 stipulate
an obligation to prosecute or extradite for grave breaches, which only apply in international armed conflicts, but not for other war crimes.”).
204. See id.; see also Mis̆a Zgonec-Roz̆ej & Joanne Foakes, International Criminals: Extradite
or Prosecute?, CHATHAM HOUSE BRIEFING PAPER, July 2013, at 5, http://www.chathamhouse
.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/0713bp_prose
cute.pdf (“[S]tate practice demonstrates that there is no clear answer to the question
whether the obligation to extradite or prosecute for core crimes under international law
has become part of customary international law. States’ implementation of this obligation
seems to be primarily based on treaties to which they are parties. It is thus questionable
whether state practice beyond treaties is sufficient to meet the requirements prescribed for
the formation of customary international law.”).
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Lastly, there is also some state practice to suggest that other
transnational criminal treaties, such as bilateral extradition treaties, remain operable even during armed conflicts. For instance, a
fugitive was extradited from Iraq to the United States on July 28,
2014205—over a month after ISIS invaded and took control of
Mosul206 and during the midst of the non-international armed conflict in Iraq. That extradition was conducted pursuant to the bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Iraq.207
Similarly, in January 2014, while French forces remained engaged
in the non-international armed conflict in Mali, a fugitive was
extradited from Mali to the United States in accordance with the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons.208 Likewise, media reports indicate that other persons captured by French forces have been transferred to Malian authorities for extradition and deportation to
France.209 Nothing in the fact that armed conflicts were ongoing
in those regions served to eclipse the legal instruments that served
as the legal bases for those extraditions. Accordingly, state practice
in Europe, Africa, and North America suggests that the law of
armed conflict does not serve to preclude the operation of such
treaties.
This analysis demonstrates, therefore, that the law of armed conflict does not serve to eclipse transnational criminal law or its foundational treaties. The terrorism suppression conventions, the
regional and other multilateral conventions, and relevant bilateral
conventions all remain operative during both international and
non-international armed conflicts.

205. See Press Release, FBI, Iraq Extradites Fugitive Defense Contractor to U.S. to Face
Fraud Charges (July 28, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/cincinnati/press-releases/2014/iraqextradites-fugitive-defense-contractor-to-u.s.-to-face-fraud-charges.
206. See Iraq City of Mosul Falls to Jihadists, CBS NEWS (June 10, 2014), http://www.cbs
news.com/news/iraq-city-of-mosul-falls-into-hands-of-isis-jihadists-after-police-army-aban
don-posts/.
207. See Press Release, supra note 205.
208. See Press Release, FBI, Malian National Indicted for Murder of U.S. Diplomat to
be Arraigned Today in Brooklyn Federal Court (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/new
york/press-releases/2014/malian-national-indicted-for-murder-of-u.s.-diplomat-to-be-ar
raigned-today-in-brooklyn-federal-court.
209. See, e.g., Le Monde.fr, Le djihadiste Gilles Le Guen déféré devant la justice, May
17, 2013 (“Le djihadiste français Gilles Le Guen, arrêté au Mali fin avril, était présenté
vendredi 17 mai à un juge d’instruction en vue d’une mise en examen pour association de
malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste.”).
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CONCLUSION

ISIS continues to metastasize throughout the Middle East, funding its growth through criminal enterprises and religious propaganda, while taking new territory by using force, brutality, and
terrorism.210 Having plunged large parts of Iraq and Syria into
chaos and darkness, it now has begun expanding into other parts
of the region, violently extending its grasp to places where
resources might be found to feed its growth.211 The international
community, now attuned to the need for action against this malevolent terrorist group, has become compelled to find effective
means to counter its influence and stem its growth.212
A complete response to such a threat must necessarily include all
elements of state power, including the effective use of domestic
criminal justice frameworks.213 As United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2178 notes, “terrorism will not be defeated by military
force, law enforcement, and intelligence operations alone[.]”214
Any effort to counter ISIS, will therefore necessitate international
cooperation on a variety of levels.215 Such multilayered cooperation is necessitated by the complexity of the ISIS organization and
its operations. As Louise Shelley has noted, “ISIS is a diversified
210. See Stigall, supra note 1 (“[ISIS is] a non-state armed group that, by exploiting
ungoverned spaces and state fragility in the Middle East, has asserted a degree of control
over a large swath of territory that transcends the borders of Iraq and Syria. In so doing,
ISIS has become a stark reminder of the dangers posed by ungoverned spaces – lawless
expanses of the globe left effectively unregulated by sovereign authority, where terrorist
organizations and other transnational criminal groups are permitted to thrive.”).
211. See Geoffrey Howard, ISIS’ Next Prize, Will Libya Join the Terrorist Group’s Caliphate?,
FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 1, 2015) (“The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham is no longer just an
Iraq and Syria problem. For months now, ISIS (or groups affiliated with it) has been pushing into Libya as well. The country has long been vulnerable; the vacuum created by the
deepening political crisis and collapse of state institutions is an attractive arena for terrorist
groups. Further, control of Libya could potentially bring access to substantial revenues
through well-established smuggling networks that deal in oil, stolen cars, contraband
goods, and weapons.”).
212. See Arimatsu & Schmitt, supra note 2.
213. See Simons, supra note 3.
214. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 5, at 2.
215. See KATULIS ET AL., supra note 6 (“As with efforts to counter extremism elsewhere,
defeating ISIS will require a concentrated effort over time. Any successful U.S. strategy
must be built on a foundation of regional cooperation that requires coordinated action
from U.S. partners—a central concept of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund that
President Barack Obama proposed earlier this year. The strategy will be multifaceted,
involving intelligence cooperation, security support, vigorous regional and international
diplomacy, strategic communications and public diplomacy, and political engagement.”);
Joint Statement Issued by Partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting, supra
note 6 (noting “that ISIL/Daesh’s finances and recruitment are also increasingly being
challenged through international cooperation.”).
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criminal business, and oil is only one of its several revenue streams.
U.S. officials ignore that fact at their own peril.”216 Consequently,
international cooperation in criminal investigations will be key to
dismantling ISIS and similar groups—to deprive them of their
sources of funding, curb illicit proceeds, and bring terrorists to justice in a criminal forum.
As this Article has explicated, such cooperation generally
requires a legal basis—usually a treaty upon which countries can
base their authority to provide one another assistance. Although
one U.N. publication has errantly posited that “[t]he universal
counter-terrorism conventions and protocols do not apply in situations of armed conflict,”217 the analysis in this Article has shown
that nothing in the relevant treaties or in the law of armed conflict
prevents their continuing application during a time of armed conflict. In fact, as this Article has demonstrated, the law of armed
conflict envisions that the field of transnational criminal law (and
the body of treaties which comprise its core) will remain applicable
even amidst the din and discord of war. This is evident from analysis of the relevant legal instruments as well as state practice.218
It is critical that the United Nations promptly and publically correct its analysis so that governments in the Middle East, North
Africa, and elsewhere have clear and accurate legal guidance on
the applicability of the terrorism suppression conventions during
times of armed conflict. The terrorism suppression conventions as
well as other similar conventions—both multilateral and bilateral—remain operative and are not muted by the fact of an armed
conflict (international or non-international). Thus, tools such as
mutual legal assistance and extradition remain at the disposal of
state actors to facilitate counterterrorism efforts. This, importantly,
permits states to adopt hybrid approaches to confront hybrid
threats like that posed by ISIS. In such a critical endeavor, states
can and must utilize all elements of state power—including both
military and law enforcement capabilities—to address this increasingly complex and malevolent phenomenon.219

216. Shelley, supra note 29.
217. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 7, at 28.
218. See supra Parts III.A, IV.A.
219. For a discussion of the global ascendance of non-state armed groups in
ungoverned spaces and fragile states, see generally Dan E. Stigall, The French Intervention in
Mali, Counterterrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 223 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2015).

R
R

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Crimes Against
Internationally
Protected
5
Persons

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES

Taking of
6
Hostages

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES

Physical
Protection
of Nuclear
7
Material

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Suppression
of Unlawful
Acts of
Violence at
Airports
8
(Protocol)

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Unlawful Acts
against the
Safety of
Maritime
9
Navigation

NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES

Unlawful Acts
/ Safety of
Fixed
Platforms
Located on
the
Continental
10
Shelf
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
*
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Marking of
Plastic
Explosives
for the
Purpose of
11
Detection

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
*
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES

Suppression
of Terrorist
12
Bombings

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Suppression
of the
Financing of
13
Terrorism

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Suppression
of Acts of
Nuclear
14
Terrorism

4

3

2

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Act Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Tokyo_EN.pdf.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Hague_EN.pdf.
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Sept. 10, 2010, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Beijing_Prot_EN.pdf.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl71_EN.pdf.
5
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-7&chapter=18&lang=en.
6
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-5&chapter=18&lang=en.
7
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Feb. 8, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/cppnm_status.pdf.
8
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 473, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/VIA_EN.pdf.
9
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201, http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20%202015.pdf.
10
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 (SUA PROT),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202015.pdf.
11
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/MEX_EN.pdf.
12
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New York, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-9&chapter=18&lang=en.
13
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13075, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII11&chapter=18&lang=en.
14
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, New York, Apr. 13, 2005, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
*
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO

Unlawful Acts
against Safety
of Civil
4
Aviation

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
*
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Seizure of Seizure of
2
Aircraft
Aircraft
3
(Protocol)

unknown

1

Afghanistan YES
Bahrain
YES
Cyprus
YES
Egypt
YES
Iran
YES
Iraq
YES
Israel
YES
Jordan
YES
Kuwait
YES
Lebanon
YES
Oman
YES
Palestine
*
Qatar
YES
Saudi Arabia YES
Syria
YES
Turkey
YES
United Arab YES
Emirates
Yemen
YES
Algeria
YES
Libya
YES
Morocco
YES
Tunisia
YES
Mauritania
YES

Offenses
Committed
On Board
1
Aircraft

APPENDIX A: MATRIX OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND NORTH AFRICAN ADHERENCE
TO TERRORISM SUPPRESSION CONVENTIONS
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